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Abstract
The use of quantum bits (qubits) in cryptography holds the promise of secure
cryptographic quantum key distribution schemes. It is based usually on single-photon
polarization states. Unfortunately, the implemented “qubits” in the usual weak pulse
experiments are not true two-level systems, and quantum key distribution based on
these imperfect qubits is totally insecure in the presence of high (realistic) loss rate.
In this work, we investigate another potential implementation: qubits generated using
a process of parametric downconversion. We find that, to first (two-photon) and second
(four-photon) order in the parametric downconversion small parameter, this implemen-
tation of quantum key distribution is equivalent to the theoretical version.
Once realistic measurements are taken into account, quantum key distribution
based on parametric downconversion suffers also from sensitivity to extremely high
(nonrealistic) losses. By choosing the small parameter of the process according to the
loss rates, both implementations of quantum key distribution can in principle become
secure against the attack studied in this paper. However, adjusting the small parameter
to the required levels seems to be impractical in the weak pulse process. On the other
hand, this can easily be done in the parametric downconversion process, making it a
much more promising implementation.
pacs: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Ar, 42.50.Dv, 03.65.Bz, 89.80.+h
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INTRODUCTION
Quantum information theory suggests the possibility to accomplish tasks that
are beyond the capability of classical computer science, such as information-secure
cryptographic key distribution1. While theoretical quantum key distribution (qkd)
schemes are proven secure against very sophisticated attacks2, the experimental qkd
schemes are not yet proven secure even against very simple attacks. In this work, we
analyse the effect of losses on the security of experimental quantum key distribution.
We investigate a novel implementation, qubits produced by a process of parametric
downconversion (pdc), and we compare it to the more common implementation based
on weak coherent pulses (wcp).
A protocol is considered secure if the adversary is restricted only by the rules of
quantum mechanics, and yet cannot obtain any information on the final key. In the
four-state scheme1 usually referred to as BB84, the sender (Alice) and the receiver
(Bob) use two conjugate bases (say, the rectilinear basis, +, and the diagonal basis, ×)
for the polarization of single photons. In basis + (resp. ×), they use the two orthogonal
basis states |0+〉 and |1+〉 (resp. |0×〉 and |1×〉) to represent “0” and “1” respectively.
The basis is revealed later on, which enables Bob to decode the bit whenever he
used the same basis as Alice; otherwise, they throw the bit away. Finally, they use
error-correction and privacy amplification to obtain a potentially secure final key3, 2.
All the experiments done so far to demonstrate protocols for secure quantum key
distribution use pulses of light containing (on average) much less than one photon.
We approximate the state of the modified qubit created by this process to be in single
mode, which we call a “weak coherent pulse” (wcp). [For an explanation regarding a
description of a pulse, see Blow et al4.] We analyse the security of wcp-based schemes
while paying special attention to the losses. The channel causes huge loss rate (whether
a fiber, which causes attenuation, or free space, which causes beam broadening). In the
experimental literature, it is usually assumed that the only effect of losses is to reduce
the bit rate. We show that there are two different types of losses, channel losses and
losses due to the state (“state losses”). The state losses have impact on the bit rate.
The channel losses have a vital impact on security, in addition to their impact on the bit
rate. A careful analysis of channel losses shows that schemes that were assumed secure
are in fact totally insecure even against a simple intercept-resend attack. In intercept-
resend attacks, an eavesdropper (Eve) performs a complete measurement on the input
qubit, and she prepares and sends to Bob a state of her own, according to the outcome
of her measurement. When Alice and Bob are using linearly independent states, Eve
can sometimes get full information by performing a “positive operator value measure”
(POVM) that conclusively distinguishes such states. This is fatal in presence of high
channel losses between Alice and Bob because Eve can recreate the state near Bob and
send it to him without loss whenever she measured it conclusively, whereas she forwards
nothing to Bob otherwise! We shall refer to this attack as the conclusive-measurement
attack. This was discussed when the two-state scheme5 was invented, and its power
against the four-state scheme was realized by Yuen6.
Recently, parametric downconversion has been used to generate a polarization
singlet state7 to test Bell’s inequalities, and it is believed that it can be used as a
much better single-photon source for quantum key distribution. Here, we explain the
potential experiment and we present the modified singlet state resulting from this pdc
process. Then, we calculate the state sent to Bob, including two-photon and four-
photon terms, assuming dispersion-free devices, no dark counts and perfect detectors.
[A different use of a pdc for qkd was previously suggested8, based on Franson-type
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uncertainties, but the polarization encoding we suggest here allows for a much simpler
analysis].
We find that pdc-qkd is much more secure than wcp-qkd: The security of wcp-
qkd is destroyed in the presence of high channel loss rate due to the linear independence
obtained when adding the second-order terms. The crucial advantage of the pdc-qkd
is that the second-order terms do not affect the fact that the states in one basis are
linearly dependent on the states in the other basis. Thus, the attack that destroys the
security of wcp-qkd in the presence of high losses has no impact on pdc-qkd (when
second-order calculation and perfect detection are considered).
When imperfections in the process are taken into account, this euphoric picture
changes, and the second-order states sent to Bob are not linearly dependent anymore.
Fortunately, pdc-qkd becomes totally insecure against the conclusive-measurement
attack only in the presence of such extremely high loss rate that more serious practical
problems would have already arisen, such as the importance of dark counts, or errors
due to various inaccuracies in the devices. As we explain in the discussion, it is probably
impossible to make thewcp implementation secure against the conclusive measurement
attack, thus we suggest that the experimental effort should be directed towards the
implementation of pdc-qkd.
SECURITY OF WCP-BASED QKD
Experimental qkd is mainly based on the use of weak pulses of coherent light.
By definition, a pulse consists of a linear superposition of many frequency contributions,
but the laser pulse itself can be considered to be in a single, localized mode provided
that dispersion is not significant in any of the optical elements4.
Using Fock state notation, |0, 0〉 denotes the vacuum state, and the state |nl, m↔〉,
which describes n photons with vertical polarization and m photons with horizon-
tal polarization, is denoted more simply by |n,m〉. Ideally, the four BB84 states
should be |l〉 = |0+〉 = |1, 0〉 and |↔〉 = |1+〉 = |0, 1〉 in the + basis, and
|0×〉 = (1/
√
2)[|1, 0〉+ |0, 1〉] and |1×〉 = (1/
√
2)[|1, 0〉 − |0, 1〉] in the × basis.
Consider now a weak coherent pulse with parameter α, meaning that a photon
would be detected with probability α2 if the pulse were measured by a perfect detector.
If this pulse is polarized in the + basis, the two states are simply, to second order in α,
|0wcp+ 〉 ≈
(
1− α
2
2
)
|0, 0〉+ α|1, 0〉+
√
2α2
2
|2, 0〉
|1wcp+ 〉 ≈
(
1− α
2
2
)
|0, 0〉+ α|0, 1〉+
√
2α2
2
|0, 2〉 .
However, the two states in the × basis, when expressed as Fock states in terms of the
+ basis, are more complicated:
|0wcp× 〉 ≈
(
1− α
2
2
)
|0, 0〉+ (α/√2)
[
|1, 0〉+ |0, 1〉
]
+
√
2α2
4
[
|2, 0〉+√2|1, 1〉+ |0, 2〉
]
|1wcp× 〉 ≈
(
1− α
2
2
)
|0, 0〉+ (α/
√
2)
[
|1, 0〉 − |0, 1〉
]
+
√
2α2
4
[
|2, 0〉 −
√
2|1, 1〉+ |0, 2〉
]
.
We call those four states the modified qubits. Note that they are not two-level systems
anymore but six-level systems, or qu-hexits.
If we considered only the first order in α, as is usually done, the four states would
behave very much like the ideal BB84 states leading us to the wrong conclusion that the
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protocol is secure! However, when the second order is considered, the two states in one
basis are no longer linear combinations of the two states in the other basis. As noted by
Yuen6, this linear independence in the six-dimensional Hilbert space creates a fatal flaw
for BB84 in the presence of high losses. These states can be distinguished conclusively
by an appropriate POVM. Such measurement yields no information about the state
most of the time, but sometimes it identifies it unambiguously. As explained in the
introduction, this allows for a successful conclusive-measurement attack provided the
loss rate expected by Alice and Bob is sufficiently high. To provide numerical analysis,
one must find the states that form the POVM. This is a cumbersome calculation and we
leave it for the final paper. However, it is clear that the success probability is of order α2
(relative to the one-photon counts). Therefore, with Eve getting a conclusive result with
relative probability of order α2, and with α2 = 0.1 as in the current experiments, it
seems that a channel loss rate of 90%–95% is fatal. With current channel loss rates,
there is no escape from decreasing α by more than one order of magnitude if reasonable
security is to be achieved, and by more than two orders of magnitudes if we expect to
have secure key distribution to distances required for practical purposes.
CREATING A MODIFIED SINGLET STATE IN THE PROCESS OF PDC
In this section, we present the parametric downconversion process and we give
the output state to second order in the pdc parameter. The pdc process provides a
source of photons for Bob and Alice with important advantages over the weak coherent
pulse discussed in the previous section. A classical pump field with vertical polarization
drives a pdc crystal below threshold, thereby producing photon pairs from a two-mode
vacuum state input field |0, 0, 0, 0〉. The two output fields from the parametric downcon-
verter are correlated in time of emission as well as polarization, and conservation laws
apply to the sum of energies and momenta of the photons in the two fields. The quan-
tum field input to the parametric downconverter is assumed to be in the vacuum state.
We consider the field emitted by the pdc process and channeled through a polarization
rotator and a beam splitter, which creates entanglement between them. One arm of
the resulting output goes to Alice and the other arm goes to Bob.
We denote by |kal , la↔ , nbl , mb↔〉, or more simply |k, l, n,m〉, the state in which
there are k photons with vertical polarization and l photons with horizontal polarization
going into Alice’s arm “a”, and n photons with vertical polarization and m photons
with horizontal polarization going into Bob’s arm “b”. The pdc small parameter χ,
which is proportional to the strength of the pump field, the interaction time between
the field and the crystal and the nonlinearity of the medium, is so that a photon pair
would be detected with probability χ2 if the output of the interaction were measured
by perfect detectors. The state created by this process is an entangled state, and it
is usually assumed to be a singlet |ψ−〉 = (1/
√
2)[|0, 1, 1, 0〉 − |1, 0, 0, 1〉], but we show
in the final paper how to calculate it more precisely, to obtain the modified singlet
|χ〉 = |ψ(mod)− 〉 to second order in χ:
|χ〉 =
(
1− χ
2
2
)
|0, 0, 0, 0〉+ χ
2
[
|0, 1, 1, 0〉+ |1, 1, 0, 0〉 − |0, 0, 1, 1〉 − |1, 0, 0, 1〉
]
+
χ2
4
[
|0, 2, 2, 0〉+ |2, 2, 0, 0〉+ |0, 0, 2, 2〉+ |2, 0, 0, 2〉 − 2|1, 1, 1, 1〉
+
√
2|1, 0, 1, 2〉 −
√
2|0, 1, 2, 1〉+
√
2|1, 2, 1, 0〉 −
√
2|2, 1, 0, 1〉
]
. (1)
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CREATING A MODIFIED QUBIT IN A PDC PROCESS
In order to use pdc for performing the BB84 four-state scheme, we need to consider
the state sent from Alice to Bob. This is produced by Alice measuring her arm in a basis
(+ or ×) of her choice and letting the other arm, which is the modified qubit, go to Bob
through the quantum channel. More precisely, Alice directs her arm to an adjustable
rotator (to choose the basis of measurement: angle 0 for + and pi/4 for ×) followed by
a polarization-dependent beam splitter that sends the horizontal mode to one direction
and the vertical mode to another spatial direction. Each of these spatial modes is now
subjected to a measurement, which in the limit of perfect efficiency provides an exact
count of the number of photons that reached each detector. In this section, we analyse
to orders χ and χ2 the modified qubit thus sent to Bob resulting from the modified
singlet state.
Considering |χ〉 to order χ and perfect detectors (used by Alice), the modified
singlet is projected to yield a perfect qubit that is sent towards Bob in one of the BB84
states. With imperfect detection, but not allowing dark counts, Alice might send the
vacuum, while she thinks she sent a single photon, but this causes only state losses and
it has no effect on security as far as we could see.
When we consider |χ〉 to order χ2 and perfect detectors, this process yields a
modification of the four BB84 states, but surprisingly still results in a perfect BB84
scheme! With perfect measurements, only the terms with exactly one photon at Alice’s
site will not be discarded, so that we need only consider the terms χ
2
[|0, 1, 1, 0〉 −
|1, 0, 0, 1〉] and χ2
2
√
2
[|1, 0, 1, 2〉 − |0, 1, 2, 1〉]. In case Alice decides to rotate her mode
by angle pi/4 in order to send Bob a qubit in the × basis, the above terms change
to χ
2
√
2
[|0, 1, 1, 0〉 + |1, 0, 1, 0〉 − |1, 0, 0, 1〉 + |0, 1, 0, 1〉] and χ2
4
[|1, 0, 1, 2〉 − |0, 1, 1, 2〉 −
|0, 1, 2, 1〉 − |1, 0, 2, 1〉].
With ideal detectors and Alice measuring without rotation, the state of Eq. 1 is
projected onto |0, 1〉 or |1, 0〉 (in Alice’s arm), yielding respectively
|0pdc+ 〉 ≈
χ
2
|1, 0〉 − χ
2
2
√
2
|2, 1〉
|1pdc+ 〉 ≈ −χ
2
|0, 1〉+ χ
2
2
√
2
|1, 2〉
(since Alice used the + basis). When Alice uses the × basis, the rotated terms (calcu-
lated as before) provide the relevant contribution, yielding
|0pdc× 〉 ≈ χ
2
√
2
[
|1, 0〉+ |0, 1〉
]
− χ
2
4
[
|1, 2〉+ |2, 1〉
]
|1pdc× 〉 ≈ χ
2
√
2
[
|1, 0〉 − |0, 1〉
]
+
χ2
4
[
|1, 2〉 − |2, 1〉
]
.
The modified qubit is not a two-level system but a four-level system. Yet, all four
states lie in a two-level system spanned by any two of them. Furthermore, they satisfy
the same conditions as the theoretical BB84 states; each one in the × basis is an equal
superposition of the states in the + basis. Thus, all theoretical security analyses apply
to these states.
DISCUSSION
We have seen that pdc-qkd has a crucial advantage over wcp-qkd due to the
fact that the four states created in the pdc process are equivalent to the theoretical
5
states. However, the calculation so far assumed that Alice uses perfect measuring
devices. A calculation taking account of realistic measurements will contain also other
corrections. Then the states will be linearly independent, so that Eve can find a POVM
to distinguish between them conclusively.
Nevertheless, let us show a vital advantage of the more realistic pdc-qkd over
wcp-qkd. Even though both schemes are insecure in principle in the presence of high
channel losses, the use of pdc as a source of qubits is potentially much preferable:
For pdc qubits, the controlled parameter χ is usually smaller than 10−3, thus the
probability of having more than one photon is 10−6, conditional to having at least one
photon, and seems to be negligible when the channel losses are 99% or even much
more. Furthermore, the small parameter can be easily further decreased according
to the loss rate to potentially solve the problem, perhaps while increasing the pulse
frequency to keep the same bit rate. In wcp, the corresponding parameter α is usually
around 0.3. Unfortunately, this parameter cannot be adjusted so easily because it plays
a dual role. Decreasing it immediately increases the state losses, which are 1 − α2.
Although these are state losses and not channel losses—hence we didn’t see any effect
of these losses on security—they are crucial in this implementation: with much smaller
α it is impossible to achieve any reasonable bit rate since the state loss rate is 1− α2.
Increasing the number of pulses to overcome this problem is not an appropriate solution
since Alice needs to write down the polarization of the states in all pulses, and change
the polarization for each one.
Another important advantage of pdc-qkd is that it solves a problem usually left
unnoticed: Eve can attackwcp-qkd by eavesdropping into Alice’s lab; this can be done
by finding the setting of Alice’s polarizers using a strong pulse sent to, and reflected
from the polarizers9 in between Alice’s pulses. We are not aware of any such attack
that can be used against the pdc-qkd implementation.
Our work is only an initial step. Analysis of more realistic scenarios and of other
attacks might show that pdc-qkd is not as superior to wcp-qkd as this preliminary
study indicates.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are very thankful to Amiram Ron for helpful questions and remarks. T. Mor
is thankful to Eugene Polzik for providing the initial motivation for this work, and to
the AQIP’98 conference, organized by Brics in Denmark. B. Sanders is thankful to
S. Warburton for checking calculations and for useful comments.
REFERENCES
1. C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proc. of IEEE Inter. Conf. on Computers, Systems and Signal
Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984) p. 175.
2. E. Biham, M. Boyer, G. Brassard, J. van de Graaf and T. Mor, “Security of quantum key
distribution against all collective attacks”, Los Alamos Archive: quant-ph 9801022.
3. C.H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail and J. Smolin, J. Crypto. 5, 1 (1992).
4. K. J. Blow, R. Loudon, S. J.D. Phoenix and T. J. Sheperd, Phys. Rev. A 42, 4102 (1990).
5. C.H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
6. H. C. Yuen, Quant. Semiclass. Opt. 8, 939 (1996).
7. Z.Y. Ou and L. Mandel, Phys. Rev. Lett. 61, 50 (1988).
8. A. K. Ekert, J.G. Rarity, P.R. Tapster and G.M. Palma, Phys. Rev. Lett. 69 , 1293 (1992).
9. Such an attack was suggested by several people independently, such as Adi Shamir, Charles H.
Bennett and others.
6
